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Abstract 
Lawton’s contingency thesis (CT) states that there are no useful generalizations (“laws”) at the 
level of ecological communities because these systems are especially prone to contingent 
historical events. I argue that this influential thesis has been grounded on the wrong kind of 
evidence. CT is best understood in Woodward’s (2010) terms as a claim about the instability of 
certain causal dependencies across different background conditions. A recent distinction between 
evolution and ecology reveals what an adequate test of Lawton’s thesis would look like. To date, 
CT remains untested. But developments in genome and molecular ecology point in a promising 
direction.  
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1. Introduction  
Ecologist J.H. Lawton has developed one of the most influential recent critiques of community 
ecology (Lawton 1999). His discussion is framed around the question of whether community 
ecology admits of “general laws.” This branch of ecology studies multi-species assemblages. It 
thus focuses on a level of biological organization above (single species) populations but below 
entire ecosystems. Lawton argued that there are no “useful generalizations,” or laws, at the 
community level as such. His reason is that communities are subject to a wide range of 
contingencies that make it impossible to generalize from one instance to the next. For example, 
particular communities are shaped by different geological events. They each receive a different 
pool of migrants in a particular order. They experience different patterns of fire, flood, storm, 
and so on. These one-off events can dramatically impact the composition of a community. 
Hence, Lawton proposes that the rules governing community composition are transitory and 
idiosyncratic. However, he thinks that there is hope for generality at other levels of ecological 
investigation. Law-like regularities obtain at the (lower) population level and at the (more 
inclusive) macroecological level. They are found at the population level, according to Lawton, 
because these systems are simpler and behave in a more uniform fashion. By contrast, at the 
macroecological level regional contingences become less influential.  At this level, one looks at 
ecosystems on a broad geographic and temporal scale, “whereby a kind of statistical order 
emerges from the scrum” (1999, 183). These considerations inspired Lawton to pronounce the 
end of community ecology as a viable discipline: 
In sum, community ecology may have the worst of all worlds. It is more complicated 
than population dynamics, so contingent theory does not work, or rather, the contingency 
is itself too complicated to be useful. But paradoxically, community ecology is not big 
and bold enough to break out of the overwhelming complexity within which it appears to 
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be enmeshed. All this begs the question of why ecologists continue to devote so much 
time and effort to traditional studies in community ecology. In my view, the time has 
come to move on. (ibid)  
Many ecologists have heeded this suggestion. Lawton’s paper has received an average of 37 
citations per year since its publication, mostly endorsing his contingency thesis. Others who view 
their research as significant beyond the local field or stream find Lawton’s conclusion 
unbearably pessimistic (Chave 2013). These community ecologists soldier on in the search for 
generality despite Lawton’s warnings. Here I argue that they are correct to do so.  
 Lawton’s argument assumes that if a community has been influenced by unique historical 
events, then it cannot be explained in terms of law-like processes. I argue that this assumption is 
confused about the explanatory roles of ecology and history. Specifically, it views these two 
types of explanation as mutually exclusive. An alternative picture has recently been developed in 
the field of genome ecology (Linquist et al. 2013), which can be applied to the community level. 
On this picture, ecological and evolutionary (or historical) explanations make different 
idealizations about the same underlying process. In its pure form, ecological explanation treats 
focal entities (genes, populations, communities, etc.) as static types while focusing on how their 
intrinsic properties interact with features of the environment. Evolutionary explanation, in its 
pure form, accounts for changes in focal entities over time while ignoring relations to the 
environment.  More will be said, momentarily, about these two modes of explanation and how 
they are sometimes used conjointly –such as in explanations of evolution by natural selection. 
The important thing to note is how this picture refutes Lawton’s argument.  A useful analogy can 
be drawn to the field of developmental biology. In this field, a purely genetic explanation 
attempts to idealize over environmental differences, while a purely environmental explanation 
ignores genetic differences. The field of genetics has moved beyond the simple-minded idea that 
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evidence of an environmental influence negates the possibility of a genetic explanation. Rather, 
geneticists have developed statistical techniques for determining, given a certain pattern of 
variation in some trait, how much of it is explained by genetic and environmental factors, 
respectively. The same approach applies to historical and ecological factors and their influence 
on community composition. When we adopt this approach, it becomes apparent that Lawton’s 
contingency thesis is based on the wrong kind of data. He argues from evidence of contingency 
in particular communities to the conclusion that patterns of variation among communities cannot 
be explained by ecological laws. This would be like inferring from evidence of a genetic 
influence on some trait, in a particular individual, that variation among individuals cannot be 
explained by environmental factors. In both cases the reasoning is fallacious. Thus, it remains an 
open question whether ecological communities can be explained in terms of law-like relations to 
the environment.  
   This essay will proceed as follows. Section 2 offers a more precise statement of 
Lawton’s contingency thesis by drawing on Woodward’s (2010) concepts of stability and 
contingency. Section 3 reviews Lawton’s evidence for the contingency thesis. Section 4 
introduces the operative distinction between ecology and evolution (or history). Section 5 applies 
this distinction to the community level and explains why Lawton’s evidence falls short of 
supporting his conclusion.  
2. Interpreting Lawton. 
Philosophers and ecologists disagree about the conditions for natural laws (Colyvan 2003; Lange 
2005). My current aim is not to wade into these disputes.  Instead, I offer an interpretation of 
what Lawton means by “contingent” and how to best define the field of community ecology. 
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Clarifying these terms is a necessary first step in understanding his argument that there are no 
stable (or law-like) generalizations in this field.  
 Lawton distinguishes laws from patterns on the grounds that, “Patterns are regularities in 
what we observe in nature; that is, they are ‘widely observable tendencies;’” whereas laws are 
the “general principles that underpin and create the patterns” (1999, 178).  This statement 
suggests that Lawton views laws as causal generalizations, while patterns are mere correlations.  
Lawton notes that patterns can vary in their generality: “Indeed they raise the vexing problem of 
how many exceptions to general patterns might exist before we would no longer regard them as 
patterns” (ibid).  A similar problem arises for laws regarding their generality.  Although some 
interpretations of Lawton take him to view laws as universal or exceptionless (Roughgarden 
2009), this would render Lawton’s position rather uninteresting. Exceptions are found even in 
the laws of chemistry and physics (Cartwright 1983). Hence it would be no surprise to find 
exceptions in ecological laws also.   
 Lawton’s position is better stated using philosopher James Woodward’s concepts of 
causal stability and contingency (Woodward, 2010). For Woodward, causal relations are 
represented as counterfactual dependencies among variables. Thus, some variable Y is 
counterfactually dependent on another variable X just in case, for some set of background 
conditions B, an intervention that changes only the value of X will result in a corresponding 
change to Y. The stability (or contingency) of a dependency is defined by the range of 
background conditions (B) across which it obtains.  Thus, a highly stable (for current purposes, 
law-like) relationship between X and Y is one that holds across a wide range of background 
conditions. Contingency is the opposite of stability, where a dependency is restricted to a limited 
range of background conditions.  
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 These ideas are easily transferred to community ecology. Typical dependent variables (Y) 
in this field include species richness, average abundance, or trophic structure of a community. 
These are ensemble properties of multi-species assemblages. Typical independent variables (X) 
include the abundance of a general predator, degree of niche overlap, or other factors thought to 
impact a community.  Background conditions (B) come in at least two dimensions: taxonomic 
distance (e.g. different phyla or families) and habitat type (e.g. aquatic, marine, and terrestrial 
habitats). Thus, in some communities it has been observed that increasing the abundance of the 
top predator increases the diversity of shared prey. This causal relation is stable, in Woodward’s 
sense, to the extent that it holds true for different taxa or across different habitats.  A contingent 
ecological dependency is one that holds for few taxa or habitat types.    
 Lawton defines community ecology as the study of sets of coexisting species interacting 
at local scales. This discipline is distinct from population ecology, he claims, insofar as 
community ecologists study assemblages greater than just two or three species. Although some 
community ecologists might object to this restriction on their discipline, it is not an issue that I 
consider here. However, I do take exception to Lawton’s requirement that community ecology 
studies only local interactions. The question of how to circumscribe communities as objects of 
study remains a challenging issue (Sterelny 2006). Lawton suggests that community ecology 
restricts its focus only to local interactions, so that processes like immigration, emigration, or 
other meta-community dynamics fall under the purview of macroecology. This will strike many 
as an artificial way to distinguish these disciplines. Community ecologists should be allowed to 
circumscribe the boundaries of their subject matter as they see fit and as nature dictates.   
 Instead of drawing the community/macroecology distinction in terms of local/non-local 
interactions, a more useful distinction is drawn between the kinds of processes that these 
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disciplines investigate. Community ecologists have traditionally set aside questions about long 
term evolutionary processes, focusing instead on the relatively short term processes governing 
the abundance and distribution of species. Strategically, this simplification makes sense if it 
indeed turns out that evolutionary processes have only a marginal influence on community 
composition and abundance. Community ecologists also tend to ignore changes in community 
composition considered over geological time scales. Over such extended periods, community 
composition and dynamics are expected to vary considerably (Kricher 1998).  By contrast, the 
macroecological perspective, which Lawton favours, takes both evolutionary and historical 
processes into account. As Lawton explains, “macroecology is a blend of ecology, biogeography, 
and evolution and seeks to get above the mind-boggling details of local community assembly to 
find a bigger picture” (1999, 183).  My suggestion is simply that the distinction between 
community ecology and macroecology is best drawn by focussing on the kinds of process that 
these disciplines investigate. Community ecology ignores, as a simplifying assumption, 
evolutionary and historical changes in the focal entities that it investigates; while macroecology 
attempts to incorporate those changes as well as the events and processes that generate them. 
This way of drawing the distinction avoids thorny issues about how to draw the boundaries 
around a community or what constitutes a “local” scale.  
 To summarize my interpretation of Lawton’s position: the counterfactual dependency 
relations identified for species assemblages greater than 2-3 members are unstable (contingent) 
across different background conditions such as distinct taxa and habitats. But contingency is 
reduced either by dropping down to the population level, or, by taking into account broad 
evolutionary or geological times scales. I refer to this as the contingency thesis.  
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3. Evidence for the Contingency Thesis.  
Lawton’s central piece of evidence in support of the contingency thesis is based on his 20 years 
researching a particular bracken fern community located in Skipwith, England. He explains that 
the relative abundances of these 17 insect species were highly predictable over short (multi-year) 
time periods – rare species stay rare and more common ones stay common.  He adds that the 
composition of the community is strongly constrained by a species of predatory ant. From 
Woodward’s perspective we can think of this as an invariance relation in which abundance of the 
predator (X) influences composition and relative abundances of the other members of the insect 
community (Y). However, Lawton suggests that this relationship is not stable across different 
background conditions (B).  
I observed an average of about 17 herbivorous insects feeding on bracken at Skipwith 
each year. Why 17? In crude order of magnitude terms, why not 2? Or 170? This most 
basic aspect of community structure may have surprisingly little to do with the local 
processes that dominate so much of traditional thinking in community ecology. (1999, 
184)  
Lawton goes on to identify two different types of “filter” that, he thinks, determine community 
composition to a greater degree than those considered by community ecologists. The first is a 
historical or evolutionary filter: “understanding the origins of the pool requires a knowledge of 
the evolutionary history of the biota, of geology, of plate tectonics, and so on” (ibid).  He 
suggests, for example, that if members of this community had arrived in a different order it 
would have altered the relationship between predator and prey abundances. Lawton’s suggestion 
is that any number of one-off events could have significantly impacted community dynamics. 
Since historical events presumably differ from one community to the next, he reasons, different 
communities will not obey the same causal dependencies.   
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 The second sort of filter that Lawton identifies is spatial. He proposes that local 
community dynamics are often influenced by such factors as their distance from a source of 
migration or overall meta-community structure. Lawton seems to be relying here on the 
aforementioned stipulation that communities are essentially local. In the previous section I 
argued that community ecologists are not required to restrict their focus to local species 
assemblages (whatever that might turn out to mean). Rather, they are free to expand or contract 
their field of investigation as the situation demands. Thus, if Lawton thought that the 
composition of his bracken fern community was largely influenced by immigration from another 
community down the road, he might just have considered them together as a single unit.  Lawton 
distinguishes community from macroecology in such a way that the former is limited both 
temporally and spatially in its purview. I argue that the field does in fact take on a different 
character when historical and evolutionary considerations are taken into account. But it is less 
committed to a particular spatial scale. Hence, we can restrict our focus to the first of Lawton’s 
two filters and ask whether a science of ecological communities can find generality while 
ignoring historical and evolutionary considerations.   
4. Distinguishing Evolution from Ecology. 
What then is the relationship between ecology and history? For that matter, what makes a 
generalization ecological in the first place? A candidate solution to these questions has recently 
emerged within the field of genome ecology (Linquist et al. 2013). This burgeoning sub-
discipline applies ecological thinking at the level of the genome, viewing families of mobile 
genetic elements as akin to species and stable features of the genome as the environment 
(Brookfield, 2005).  As is often the case, applying a familiar theory to a novel domain requires 
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close attention to its core commitments. This has led to the following operational definitions of 
“evolution” and “ecology.”  
1) A strictly evolutionary approach investigates change (or the lack thereof) in some focal 
entity over successive generations without taking into account its relationships to 
particular features of the environment.  
2) A strictly ecological approach assumes (for simplicity) no change in the focal entities 
themselves, but focuses instead on the relationships between those entities and features of 
their environment. 
In the following section I apply these definitions to the community level and explain how a 
strictly evolutionary approach is equivalent to what Lawton would classify as an historical 
approach. The remainder of this section explicates this distinction and shows how it can be used 
to determine the extent to which some patterns calls for an ecological or evolutionary 
explanation.  
 It is important to note that each mode of investigation is being defined here in its “strict” 
or pure form.  This is just to say that, considered on its own, each approach makes different sorts 
of idealizing assumptions.  For example, the work of Michael Lynch (2007) exemplifies of a 
purely evolutionary approach.  His “mutation hazard” model proposes that large amounts of 
genome evolution can be explained just in terms of mutation rate (M) and effective population 
size (Ne). The focal entity in this case is a population or gene pool. M and Ne are variables that 
apply to intrinsic features of a gene pool, they ignore its relations to features of the environment. 
In particular, natural selection is not taken into account by this model. It is assumed that when 
Ne is low the influence of selection on genome evolution is negligible.  This is just to say that the 
environment is ignored by this model under certain conditions. Suppose, then, that the dependent 
variable of interest is the degree of genetic divergence among a range of related species. Lynch 
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might explain this pattern of variation by appealing to mutation rate, the length of time over 
which the populations have been isolated, and the respective population sizes. This would 
qualify as a strictly evolutionary explanation according to definition 1, since the pattern is being 
explained in terms of changes in the focal entity while idealizing away relations to particular 
features of the environment.  
 Strictly ecological explanations are perhaps even more familiar. Ecologists routinely 
conduct studies of populations that focus exclusively on their relation to the environment while 
ignoring changes in the focal entities themselves. For example, the introduction of the Canadian 
beaver to Argentina in the 1940s led to a population explosion. Here the focal entity is a 
particular population and the relevant dependent variable is its growth rate. Ecologists attempt to 
determine which of several possible ecological variables (e.g. lack or predators, suitability of 
habitat) best explain the much higher rate of population growth in Argentina compared to North 
America. These studies attempt to account for differences in this dependent variable in terms of 
various relations to the environment (Anderson et al.  2006). However, they do so without 
considering whether northern and southern populations differ genetically. That is, they tend not 
to consider whether there has been change in the focal entities that might accounts for their 
differential growth rates.  Presumably there are good reasons for thinking, in this case, that 
genetic differences are negligible. The relevant point is that this mode of explanation is purely 
ecological in that it assumes of focal entities that they are a static type (beavers are beavers, 
regardless of the population) while focusing on their relation to the environment.    
 Of course, many patterns in nature cannot be explained either in strictly evolutionary or 
strictly ecological terms.  Often the two types of factor interact. In these cases, it is often 
necessary to consider how relations between the focal entity and its environment influence 
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subsequent changes in the entities. This would qualify as a combined or “hybrid” explanation – 
one that incorporates both evolutionary and ecological factors.  Explanations of evolution by 
natural section are a familiar example (Endler 1986).  
 Hybrid explanations are undeniably more epistemically demanding than either form of 
strict explanation. For this reason it is often preferable to establish whether a purely evolutionary 
or purely ecological model will account for most of the variation in some variable of interest. It 
is prudent to address this question before attempting to consider both evolutionary and ecological 
factors in conjunction. There is no need to adopt a more complicated hybrid model if a simpler 
model will do. Within genome ecology a straightforward strategy has been developed to 
determine the extent to which a given pattern can be explained by ecological or evolutionary 
factors (Linquist et al. 2013). One begins with a dependent variable of interest.  A population of 
entities is then selected in which there is variation in the dependent variable. Variation in the 
dependent variable is required in order to determine the relative contributions of ecological and 
evolutionary factors. The next step is to identify independent ecological and evolutionary factors 
that are likely to influence the dependent variable.  It is here that definitions 1 & 2 come into 
play. Evolutionary variables are ones that identify changes in the focal entities over time. For 
example, in the case of genome ecology, phylogenetic distance is used as a proxy for their 
evolutionary or historical divergence (ibid). Ecological variables are features of the environment 
thought to stand in a casual relation to the dependent variable. Admittedly, it is conceptually and 
empirically challenging to identify independent (ecological and evolutionary) variables that are 
suitable for this kind of an analysis. Those variables must themselves vary among entities in the 
sample. Only then can one determine how much of the variation in the dependent variable 
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correlates with ecological and evolutionary factors, respectively. But once the relevant variables 
are identified, conducting this type of analysis is a fairly simple matter of statistical regression.  
5. Identifying Generality at the Community Level.  
Recall that Lawton was worried about the disproportionate influence of historical “filters” on 
communities. He proposed that various one-off events would dramatically alter their composition 
and dynamics. We can think of these events as equivalent to the evolutionary factors identified in 
definition 1. Imagine a community that experiences some unpredictable disruption such as a fire 
or flood.  On the one hand, this might seem to be an “ecological” influence since it is externally 
imposed on the community. However, by hypothesis these are one-off events. Hence they cannot 
be treated as variables that take on various values across a range of communities. To treat these 
events in such a fashion would just be to regard them as ordinary ecological factors. To be sure, 
in some instances fire or flood might be viewed as a quantitative ecological variable. But we are 
interested here in what it means for these rare events to serve as a historical filter that potentially 
mitigates an ecological explanation. To view these events as historical contingencies, I suggest, 
involves viewing them just in terms of their effects on community structure and not, as it were, 
as types of causes.  In other words, when considering the impact of one–off events the relevant 
question concerns their impact on a community, and not whether the event was a fire, flood, or 
some other factor per se. Insofar as these events have the same type of effect there is no point in 
distinguishing them. By analogy, Lynch’s model is interested in how changes in Ne impact the 
fixation of alleles. It doesn’t matter about which particular events lead up to a change in Ne.  For 
explanatory purposes these “environmental” factors are treated as a generic kind of cause. Hence 
the explanation abstracts away from particular relationships to the environment. Much the same 
applies to the one-off events that Lawton was concerned about.   
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 Let us then consider how definitions 1 and 2 are applied to an ecological community. 
Suppose that the focal entities are insect communities such as the one Lawton observed.  In order 
to conduct a regression analysis we require a population of these communities that vary in some 
(quantitative) dependent variable. Following Lawton, let’s choose rank abundance as the 
relevant dependent variable. This standard measure in community ecology plots the relative 
abundance of community members against their rank in abundance, thus generating a curve with 
a particular shape and slope for each community. The advantage of this as a dependent variable 
is that it provides a common measure for comparing taxonomically distinct communities.   
 Lawton’s example of predator density is a suitable independent ecological variable, 
provided that it also varies across the set of communities in the sample. Of course, numerous 
other ecological variables might be selected. It bears mentioning that there is a considerable 
danger of false negatives when applying this framework to test for ecological influences on some 
dependent variable. Unless one selects the correct independent variable, an ecological influence 
could easily be overlooked.   
  A greater challenge concerns the selection of historical variables. In the case of genome 
ecology, phylogenetic relatedness served as a proxy for historical or evolutionary distance. Thus, 
it was possible to determine how much of the variation among genomes in a sample correlates 
with phylogenetic distance. The problem is that prototypical communities are less cohesive than 
genomes. Their members move independently from one community to another. Hence one 
cannot easily reconstruct a phylogenetic tree for a sample of communities. How then might one 
identify a quantitative variable to stand in for historical distance? 
 These limitations are indeed challenging when it comes to most prototypical 
communities.  It might simply turn out that assemblages of macro flora and fauna are poor 
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choices for testing the contingency thesis. However, recent years have seen increased interest in 
molecular and genome ecology.  Diverse communities containing thousands of microorgansims 
can be contained in a single test tube (Swenson et al. 200), or, in the case of gene families, 
uploaded to a database. These communities are easily isolated as cohesive units with divergent 
histories. Thus the molecular and genetic levels offer ample opportunity to test for the influence 
of chance historical events on community level variables. With this qualification in mind we 
can imagine how one might test for the stability of an ecological relationship.  This would 
involve comparing the influence of ecological and evolutionary variables across a range of 
different taxa and habitat types.  There are a wide range of molecular and genetic systems in 
which these experiments could be conducted. Similarly, the dependency between predator 
abundance and rank abundance could be tested across a range different habitat types. Lawton’s 
contingency thesis would predict little stability in ecological relationships among these different 
types of community and distinct habitats. To date, no adequate test of this hypothesis has been 
conducted.        
 Thinking back to Lawton’s argument it becomes clear that he was in no position to 
pronounce the demise of community ecology. It is a straightforward fallacy to assume that the 
presence of a historical explanation for some particular community undermines the explanatory 
power of ecological laws. Nor would it make quantitative sense to ask, “How much of the 
Skipwith bracken fern community was determined by its historical and ecological factors, 
respectively?”  Any given community will be influenced by both.  To partition the relative 
contributions of ecology and history one must compare a population of communities in which 
there is variation in the dependent variable of interest. One also requires a way to quantify 
ecological and historical influences on that dependent variable. Only then, by looking for 
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ecological correlations that obtain across a range of background conditions, can one determine 
the stability or contingency of an ecological dependency.  
6. Conclusion 
Perhaps the take-home message from this discussion is that demonstrating contingency in 
community ecology is no simple affair. Only certain communities will lend themselves to the 
kind of quantitative analysis that I have outlined.  There are significant challenges associated 
with identifying and measuring the relevant variables.  Even if one finds an apparent influence of 
history on the dependent variable, there will be looming questions about whether some 
unidentified ecological variable is perhaps being overlooked. To make matters more complex, an 
assessment of stability or contingency must proceed across a diverse range of taxa and habitats. 
In fairness to Lawton, neither the conceptual framework nor the requisite data were available at 
the time he was writing. However, I have suggested that recent advances in molecular and 
genome ecology make it easier to test the contingency thesis. As it stands, Lawton’s thesis has 
been supported by the wrong kind of data. It therefore remains an open question whether there 
are stable ecological generalizations at the community level.  
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